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ABSTRACT 
 
FRASER HOLMES: Civil Society, Political Society, and Democratization 
(Under the direction of Jeff Spinner-Halev) 
 
 
The study of civil society and its role in the process of democratization is one that 
has undergone a number of revisions in the past two decades. Once lauded by scholars 
such as Robert Putnam as laboratories for democracy and developers of social capital, the 
promises of civil society went largely unrealized in the wake of the Third Wave. This 
paper contends that the role of civil society in the process of democratization is 
misunderstood because of the theoretical fuzziness surrounding the concept of civil 
society, and attempts to present political society – a crucial subset of civil society – as 
vital in a nation’s attempt for a successful transition to democracy. It goes on to argue the 
theoretical strength of an approach centered on political society, and concludes with a 
description of the types of groups necessary for a successful transition to democracy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the years of the democratic boom following the Cold War, scholars and policy 
makers alike praised the power of civil society in the creation and consolidation of 
democratic regimes in Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America. Strachwitz and 
Zimmer (2010) claim that “anti-governmental civil society action played a pivotal role in 
bringing about the end of the Cold War and the peaceful transformation of the Central 
and Eastern European countries, including East Germany” (274), while Glenn (2001) 
notes the hope of many observers that “the concept of civil society – prominent in the 
mobilizing claims made by the Citizens’ Committees in Poland, and Civic Forum and 
Public Against Violence in Czechoslovakia – would become a political blueprint for the 
future of post-communist countries” (193). The relationship between civil society and 
democratization seemed so secure that Gordon White (2007) was confident in 
proclaiming “the role of civil society organizations in fostering democratic transitions” as 
a “palpable fact” (71). 
 Such a view was almost certainly bolstered by the triumph of liberal capitalist 
democracy, for the promises of civil society were presented almost entirely in terms of 
the liberal definition of the concept. Civil society was seen as “a crucial arena for the 
development of other democratic attributes, such as tolerance, moderation, a willingness 
to compromise, and a respect for opposing viewpoints” (Diamond 1994, 8), and it was 
touted as being key in the development and “teaching [of] civic virtue – a key moral 
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value that emphasizes respect for the common values and ways of life that empower 
people to search for as well as to uphold the common good” (DeLue 2002, 348, italics in 
original). As a buffer against the intrusion of the state, a school for civic education, and a 
laboratory for democratic participation, civil society promised to be a key factor in the 
democratization process of formerly authoritarian states throughout the globe based on its 
status as “a separate sphere of groups and associations... [that] embodies both the civic 
virtues of toleration and mutual respect” (DeLue 18). 
 Two decades later, however, the promises of civil society as a democratizing 
force have gone largely unrealized. “Civil society in the post-communist countries of 
Eastern Europe,” while ostensibly bastions of democratic legitimacy in the early 1990s, 
became “relatively weak” (Olivo 1998, 731), a trend which continued into the twenty-
first century, as attested to by Narozhna (2004): “Instead of counterbalancing the state, 
Eastern European society has traditionally retreated to protecting itself from the state. 
Civic activity was reduced to regular participation in highly manipulated elections” (307). 
Membership rates – a common measure of the strength of civil society organizations – 
started a downward slide that continued in newly democratized states and established 
democracies alike. In the former East Germany, for instance, membership rates “have not 
changed much since 1990… Moreover, compared to West Germany, there are many 
fewer associations in small towns and in the countryside. Particularly in the countryside, 
voluntary organizations and clubs are struggling with an eroding membership base, 
leading some analysts… to view the development of civil society in East Germany rather 
skeptically” (Anheier, et al 2000, 144). And civil society associations throughout the 
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world are plagued by a failure of reality living up to “theoretical expectations” (Ibid. 738; 
see also Mansfeldova 2004). 
 These “theoretical expectations” must be seen as part of the problem. In part, they 
were the result of the fact that “as an analytical concept, civil society and the sectoral 
models to which it is attached suffer from acute definitional fuzziness” (Edwards and 
Foley 1998, 126). In the “voluminous collection of works on civil society,” debates were 
held about the “essence of the concept” and its practical applications, but there were 
“hardly ever [any] offerings of a definition” (Narozhna 296). Those attempts to define 
civil society that did arise often resulted in trying to hit a moving target, as “the meaning 
of the concept [of civil society]… shifted considerably according to the wider political 
context” (Baker 2007, 23). This is particularly true in democratizing countries, where 
civil society is now thought of as playing “different roles at different stages of the 
democratization process,” depending on whether it is need to mobilize “pressure for 
political change” or to “enhance state legitimacy” by “checking abuses of state power, 
preventing the resumption of power by authoritarian governments, and encouraging 
wider citizen participation and public scrutiny” (Mercer 2002, 7-8).   
 A larger cause to these unmet theoretical expectations, however, must be the fact 
that civil society has always been cast in a strictly positive light: most definitions of civil 
society do not allow for groups that are non-pluralistic, or repressive, or exclusionary, or 
hierarchical. This point is perhaps encapsulated best by Larry Diamond, who argues that, 
“to the extent that a group seeks to conquer the state or other competitors, or rejects the 
rule of law and the authority of the democratic state, it is not a component of civil society 
at all” (8). This is certainly how we would like to conceive of civil society, but in 
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practice, distinguishing between groups based on motivation is often difficult. Moreover, 
civil society as a concept is not always a force for progress. As Fatton (1998) argues,  
Civil society is not the all-encompassing movement of popular empowerment and 
economic change portrayed in the reveling and exaggerated celebrations of its 
advocates. It is simply not a democratic deus ex machina equalizing life-chances 
and opportunities; crippled by material limitations and class impairments it 
constitutes at best a very uncertain substitute to what had previously been the 
corrupt and class-based patronage of a more profligate state” (72). 
 
In addition, “civil society’s pluralism is not always emancipatory,” but rather can 
also “be a reservoir of antiquated norms and practices” (Ibid. 75). Even with the rose-
tinted glasses of civil society offered by “the liberal worldview,” civil society “can also 
have a detrimental impact on democratic consolidation.” For instance, “where civil 
society is considered to be weak, underdeveloped or fragmented, or where there is severe 
socio-economic strain, corruption, an ineffective legal system, a tendency towards civil 
disruption and conflict and a lack of ‘democratic culture,’ democratic consolidation is 
thought to be threatened” (Mercer, 8).  
The relationship between civil society and democratization, therefore, is far from 
settled, and the “simplistic antinomy between state and civil society, locked in a zero-sum 
struggle, will not do”; what is required, instead, is a “more complex conceptualization 
and nuanced theory” (Diamond, 5). Perhaps the first step in this process is the recognition 
that some groups that make up civil society have a larger role to play in the 
democratization process than others. To a certain degree, this effort has been made by 
many scholars of civil society. Almond and Verba (1963) distinguish between those 
associations that are “purely social” and those that “are directly and overtly politically 
oriented.” While “one can argue… that membership in even a nonpolitical organization 
will affect political attitudes… one would also expect to find that those organizations 
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more directly involved in politics would have greater effects on the political perspectives 
of their members” (176-177). In fact, as shown by their empirical evidence, “membership 
in a politically oriented organization appears to lead to greater political competence than 
does membership in a nonpolitical organization, and active membership in an 
organization has a greater impact on political competence than does passive membership” 
(Ibid., 187). Nor are these differences between groups reflected simply in the political 
competencies of their members. “It is clear that each group [within civil society] is 
characterized by a different level of internal cohesion and therefore collective action.” In 
other words, “bowling leagues are not capable of storming beaches or lobbying 
Congress” (Fukuyama 2001, 13). 
Such differentiations bring up a more important point. Against the conventional 
wisdom, “a vibrant civil society is probably more essential for consolidating and 
maintaining democracy than for initiating it” (Diamond, 7). Thus, the promotion of civil 
society in terms of bird-watching groups, bowling leagues and bridge clubs may be vital 
for established democracies like the United States, but support of these types of groups 
makes much less sense for many countries in the initial phases of democratization. For 
such countries, the Tocquevillian ideal of civil society as a laboratory for democracy, or 
the Hegelian ideal of civil society as a locus of ethical perfection, or the Putnamesque 
ideal of civil society as creator of civic virtue, is not only optimistic, it is an empirical 
falsehood. Civil society at the liberal ideal is simply beyond the capacities of groups and 
organizations that have recently emerged (or are in the process of emerging from) 
authoritarian regimes; while these conceptions may gain salience as countries progress 
along the path to democracy, they quite simply lack the ability to generate the type of 
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political environment where each can survive. As such, rather than strictly civil society, 
what should be emphasized are groups that can be said to represent political society, a 
crucial subset of civil society which takes as its goal not the promotion of civic virtue or 
liberal norms, but rather a strategy of mobilization which can voice previously neglected 
demands, and which can help create a space where groups of the type much lauded by 
civil society theorists can be born and flourish. Indeed, “the making of a long-lasting 
democracy is a virtual impossibility without the emergence of ‘political society’” (Fatton, 
89; see also Arato (2000)).  
Against Diamond, these groups which make up political society should not be 
seen as “a fourth arena of social action” distinct and autonomous from civil society, nor 
should they be thought of as simply “the party system” (Diamond, 7). Rather, groups that 
make up political society are identified by four distinct but mutually codependent and 
interactive parts, all of which contribute to political society’s importance in the processes 
of democratization. Groups can be said to be part of political society if they have 
influence, or the ability to have its claims and demands heard and recognized by the 
powers that be, generally the state or the ruling regime; self-limitation, the group’s 
commitment to disavowal of direct power, particularly as regards state power; 
accountability, the ability to funnel claims to responsive but powerful leaders capable of 
interacting with key elites in the ruling regime; and representation, a group’s ability to 
represent those outside of its narrow purview of specific interests. 
Emphasizing the role of political society rather than civil society within the 
democratization process offers two advantages. The first is primarily theoretical: by 
shifting the focus to groups that constitute political society, scholars can obviate the 
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continued difficulties in defining and conceptualizing civil society. As will be argued 
below, it is difficult to know which groups can be said to belong to civil society – and, 
thus, which groups should be promoted for their democratizing potential – because 
conceptualizing civil society in terms of an area of political space outside of both the 
state and market is becoming increasingly distant from political realities. By contrast, 
groups that make up political society can be identified by the extent to which they use 
and embrace the principles of influence, self-limitation, legitimacy and representation, a 
rubric which not only defines its constituents in non-negative terms, but also one that 
allows for greater analytical clarity. Additionally, emphasizing political society does not 
force us to engage the concept on the overly optimistic theoretical terms that is the 
hallmark of defining civil society. In other words, because political society is a more 
value-neutral term and conception than civil society, it is more strongly rooted to the 
political realities of its existence, and not to an ideal that has been promulgated for more 
than two centuries.  
The second advantage of emphasizing political society is more normative. By 
illustrating how groups within political society act, we better know which groups are 
beneficial to democracy, which groups are harmful, and which groups are largely 
irrelevant. With a concept as large and often unwieldy as civil society, many groups are 
granted an artificial importance in the democratizing process, which keeps scholars and 
policy makers from isolating the truly vital groups in democracy promotion. This shift in 
focus also helps us understand the true extent and impact of the much theorized “death of 
civil society.” Clearly, many scholars, Robert Putnam chief among them, saw a decline in 
membership in all aspects of organizational life: they saw, in other words, more and more 
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people “bowling alone.” But from a political perspective, some groups clearly have a 
more meaningful relationship to democracy and the process of democratization than do 
others, and blanket statements regarding declining membership rates do little to help us 
understand the relationship between organizational life and democracy promotion. By 
emphasizing the characteristic of organizational life that make democratization most 
likely, we can better identify the groups which should receive our increasingly limited 
resources. Emphasizing political society, then, is one step on the path to – to paraphrase 
Putnam – making democracy work. 
	   
 
CHAPTER 2 
OVERCOMING CIVIL SOCIETY 
In order to best understand the importance of emphasizing political societies in 
democracy promotion, we must first appreciate the shortcomings of civil society, both in 
theory and in practice. To begin, civil society is often defined in terms of what it is not: 
civil society has historically been defined first and foremost in terms of its role as a check 
against state power. Calhoun (1993) argued that historically “the idea of civil society 
entered political philosophy and social theory as a way of describing the capacity of self-
organization on the part of a political community, in other words, the capacity of a 
society to organize itself without being organized by the state” (391). Hadenius and 
Uggla (1996) see civil society as “a certain area of society which is … dominated by 
interaction of a certain kind…. The organizations of civil society exist, outside the realm 
of the state, and on a free and independent basis” (1621).1 And Shils (1997) sees the idea 
of civil society as “the idea of a part of society which has a life of its own, which is 
distinctly different from the state, and which is largely autonomous from it. Civil society 
lies beyond the boundaries of the family and the clan and beyond the locality; it lies short 
of the state” (292). 
Recently, political theorists and students of comparative politics alike have 
increasingly defined civil society as distinct not only from the state, but also from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  civil	  society	  as	  a	  space	  of	  voluntary	  organizations	  outside	  of	  the	  coercive	  apparatus	  of	  the	  state	  (and	  other	  political	  institutions)	  is	  also	  emphasized	  by	  Walzer	  (1990).	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forces of the capitalist market: as a result, civil society has come to be understood as that 
arena in political space between the state and the market. Thus, for DeLue, “the term civil 
society… refers to a space that exists between the national government and the 
individual…. Moreover, [civil society] groups are also independent of large corporate, 
business organizations whose power to dominate markets and to influence government is 
vast and decisive” (10-11).  Diamond sees civil society as “an intermediate entity, 
standing between the private sphere and the state,” claiming that “it excludes individual 
and family life, inward-looking group activity (e.g., for recreation, entertainment, or 
spirituality), the profit-making enterprise of individual business firms, and political 
efforts to take control of the state” (5) without ever really saying what such an entity 
includes. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992), in their seminal work Capitalist 
Development and Democracy, conceive of civil society as “the totality of social 
institutions and associations, both formal and informal, that are not strictly production-
related nor governmental or familial in character” (49). And Cohen and Arato (1992) see 
the current discourse on civil society as focusing “precisely on new, generally non-class-
based forms of collective action oriented and linked to the legal, associational, and public 
institutions of society. These are differentiated not only from the state but also from the 
capitalist market economy” (271). 
 Such understandings, however, subject the current conceptions of civil society to 
a number of theoretical flaws. The first is that defining civil society in terms of political 
space makes it less illustrative of the current political realities. . In part, this has to do 
with the shifting and melding of the spaces of the state and market themselves: as attested 
to by much of the globalization literature (see, e.g. Axtmann 2004; Evans 1997; Hirst and 
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Thompson 1995; Mann 1997; Shaw 1997; Weiss 1997), aspects of sovereignty which 
were once thought to be within the exclusive domain of the state are increasingly coming 
under the power of market forces. “States are less autonomous, they have less exclusive 
control over the economic and social processes within their territories, and they are less 
able to maintain national distinctiveness and cultural homogeneity” (Hirst and 
Thompson, 415), with the ultimate result that “the power of nation-states as 
administrative and policy-making agents has declined” (Ibid., 435). Moreover, a 
definition of civil society strictly in terms of the domestic market and nation-state fails to 
account for new international and transnational sovereign institutions such as the EU and 
international markets and financial organizations like the WTO and the World Bank 
(institutions that carry particular weight for developing democracies). In other words, 
defining civil society as an institution occupying political space fails to account for the 
changes brought about by an increasingly globalized world. 
 Furthermore, this conception of political space assumes a zero-sum scenario 
where any power in “one sphere can increase only at the expense of another” (Sales 1991, 
299). This theoretical conception, however, seems to be without strong empirical 
backing. In fact, an increase in state power and capability often results in a more 
powerful civil society, not a weaker or more circumscribed one (Chazan 1992). Rather 
than possessing a conflictual relationship, civil society and the state are better seen as 
possessing a “mutual or recursive” relationship (Hadenius and Uggla, 1628), and Fatton 
argues for “a dialectical interaction between state and civil society. The state is 
transformed by a changing civil society; civil society is transformed by a changing state” 
(67). The idea that a strong state or market threatens the viability of civil society seems 
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reflective of the attitude, mentioned above, that civil society is first and foremost a 
democratic check against a repressive and autocratic state. Certainly protest against a 
regime can be indicative of a vibrant and active civil society, and certainly civil society is 
unlikely to flourish under a repressive state. But we should be hesitant in our assumption 
that protest movements indicate a faltering state in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian 
regimes (see Robertson 2010), and “we need to distinguish between the state’s capacity 
for repression from its willingness” (Glenn, 17). 
 Finally, the definition of civil society as everything outside of the state and the 
market leads to the inclusion of some organizations that many scholars would have 
difficult classifying as civil society organizations. Again, this seems to be a result of the 
increasing anachronism of Hegelian and Gramscian conceptions of civil society. The 
difficulty in placing movements like paramilitary groups is further indicative of the 
shifting of political space and conventional notions of state/society relations. As Hunt 
(2009) argues, paramilitaries illustrate “the problematic reinscription of a conceptual 
binary between state and society. [It] demonstrates empirically [that] paramilitaries 
transcend the boundaries between state and society.” The case of paramilitaries also 
“disproves the understanding of state and society as separate spheres”; paramilitaries 
should not “be understood as either a tool of a terrorist state or the product of an 
uncontrollable civil society that victimizes the state,” but rather as “a form of 
contemporary governance that inseparably links state and citizen construction and 
unfailingly transcends suspected state and society boundaries” (82). A conception of civil 
society as simply the political gray zone between state and market misses the intricacies 
of the organizational strategies of paramilitaries and groups like them and leaves scholars 
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without the proper understanding of the role groups like these play in the democratizing 
process. 
 Nor do current definitions of civil society fail on strictly spatial grounds. There is 
the additional difficulty provided by the fact that civil society is often conceived as a 
perpetually benign institution, incapable of any activity that might threaten democratic 
thought or action. Diamond sees civil society as “a crucial arena for the development 
of… democratic attributes, such as tolerance, moderation, a willingness to compromise, 
and a respect for opposing viewpoints” (8). Thus, many scholars of civil society 
throughout history – like Tocqueville and Putnam – “saw local voluntary associations of 
all sorts as beneficial” (Mouristen 2003, 656) because they provided citizens with 
opportunities for leadership, reinforced kinship and other group ties and created 
opportunities for collective action. As Choup (2003) argues, “the importance of internal 
democracy in civic associations lies in the way that it serves both as a model for 
democratic processes, and as reinforcement for increased democratic practices in the 
political realm” (29). So powerful is this ideal of a democratizing civil society that “much 
of the traditional democratization literature posits that an internally democratic civil 
society is necessary for a democratic political society” (30, my italics). 
 Unfortunately, the empirical literature indicates an ever-widening gap between 
civil society at its ideal and civil society in practice. . To begin with, “civil society 
organizations do not always have crystalline accountability records, nor are they 
completely immune from the accusation of being centered in the ‘first world’, most 
notably in Europe, or of being somehow carriers of ‘cultural normalization’” (Spini 2011, 
23). This of course has particular relevance to newly democratizing countries, where 
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foreign NGOs and other civil society organizations are often poorly run, poorly financed 
and beholden to interests outside of the country in which they are located. Moreover, 
“there is no justification for representing civil society as a space immune from the 
exercise of power” (Ibid., 24); in fact, “if power is not channeled into post-national 
political and constitutional forms, civil society risks becoming the breeding ground for 
post-democratic public spaces rather than for post-national democracies” (Ibid., 28). 
 The continued act of defining civil society in terms of an organizational ideal also 
led to an overemphasis of the role civil society plays in the process of democratization. 
While undeniably important, civil society is “not the sole and the dominant factor of 
democratic consolidations” (Szabo 2004, 80), to say nothing of less mature steps in the 
democratization process, where it is likely neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. 
Moreover, the literature seems only to discuss democratic civil society as a necessary 
condition of democratic consolidation, but not the continuance of democratic government 
(or, to use Dahl’s terms, the progression from democracy to polyarchy). Thus, the 
literature is unable to link the role of civil society in democratizing states vis-à-vis 
established or consolidated democracy, a particularly troubling shortcoming given the 
fact that involvement in civil society organizations have decreased not only in Eastern 
Europe (see Mansfeldova, especially 117), but also in the longer-lived democracies in 
Western Europe and the United States. 
 It is clear, then, that understanding democratization in terms of civil society has 
likely outlived its analytical usefulness. Not only are conventional definitions of civil 
society divorced from the empirical reality, but the normative implications of civil 
society have also clouded the evaluations of civil society’s role in facilitating a successful 
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democratic transition process. Fortunately, political society, particularly as conceived of 
here, elides both of these shortcomings of civil society more generally: not only can we 
define political society in terms of what it is and how it operates, we can also approach 
political society with an eye towards making the concept more illustrative of the political 
realities. Moreover, by creating a rubric by which we can grade the extent to which 
groups have entered into political society, we can better identify which groups should be 
promoted and which groups are better left alone, a process that will help us better grasp 
what is needed for a successful democratic transition and what we can expect from 
hopeful democracies in the future. 
	   
 
CHAPTER 3 
THE ADVANTAGES OF A POLITICAL SOCIETY FRAMEWORK 
 As stated above, a group or organization can be said to belong to political society 
when they are organized around four distinct but mutually codependent and reinforcing 
parts. Groups or organizations belong to political society when, first, they direct their 
claims to the state or the ruling regime and can be reasonably sure their claims will be 
heard and recognized; this is what I term “influence.” Second, groups or organizations 
belong to political society when they direct their claims against the state or ruling regime 
without any desire to overthrow the state or ruling regime and without any desire for 
direct power or influence, particularly state power; I term this component “self-
limitation.” Third, groups or organizations belong to political society when they are 
organized with a strong leadership cadre who are nevertheless responsive to and 
responsible for the demands of wider group membership; I term this component 
“accountability.” Fourth and finally, groups or organizations belong to political society 
when they are able to represent and speak for those citizens outside of the sphere of their 
ostensible primary interest, and therefore are able to make claims which affect non-
members as well as members; I term this component “representation.” 
 Emphasizing the role of groups or organizations within political society in terms 
of their democratizing potential offers four advantages over the conventional 
understanding rooted in the entirety of civil society. First, political society can be defined 
and understood without using strictly negative terms: in other words, we can define 
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political society in terms of what it is (a particular subset of civil society where groups 
are organized around four distinct but mutually codependent and interactive parts) rather 
than what it is not (the state, the market, the family, the church, etc.). The first and most 
obvious advantage of such a definition is that it avoids the aforementioned difficulties of 
defining civil society in strictly spatial terms. Additionally, we are better able to evaluate 
the potentials for groups within political society, as well as their limitations. In so doing, 
we can better anticipate the degree of success such groups can have in developing, 
promoting and consolidating democracy, and the nature of the relationship between 
political society and democracy. Perhaps a shortcoming of this emphasis on political 
society, however, is that is does not translate well to international or transnational 
contexts; it is a conception that is rooted entirely within the purview of the nation-state. 
This disadvantage, however, is more than outweighed by its comparative strengths, 
particularly given the somewhat fragmented findings of transnational civil society 
scholars. 2 
 Second, emphasizing the role of political society makes cross-country 
comparisons clearer and more theoretically useful. Political society can be understood as 
a more static conception than civil society writ large, which is thought to play “different 
roles in different stages of the democratic process” (Mercer, 7-8) Not only does this 
theoretical inconsistency stress the differences between civil society without adequately 
explaining their similarities, it also forces us to correctly identify the current status of a 
regime in the democratizing process in order to know how civil society should proceed, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  See,	  among	  many	  others,	  Armstrong	  and	  Gilson	  (2011),	  Bartleson	  (2006),	  Bello	  (2011),	  Reichardt	  (2004),	  Robinson	  (2001),	  Ruzza	  (2011),	  and	  Spini	  (2011).	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task that is easier to describe than it is to accomplish. In contrast, political societies have 
similar goals and processes regardless of the level of democratic development in a 
country, meaning we do not have to distinguish between political societies in 
democratizing states, or in consolidated democracies, or in welfare-state democracies, or 
in liberal democracies, or in consolidating democracies. Given that such distinctions 
between regimes are often transient and/or superficial, the capacity of political society to 
obviate the need for these distinctions is a clear theoretical advantage. 
 Third, we can better compare and identify the distinct political societies per se as 
well as the regime context in which they exist. A major critique of contemporary aid to 
civil society, for instance, is that it ignores the fact that there are likely to be “active civil 
societies in non-Western states [whose] premises and objectives may be quite different” 
from those in Western states (Armstrong and Gilson, 6); by focusing on a particular 
subset of civil society, scholars and policy makers can avoid these geocentric conceptions 
of how civil society should function and focus instead on how political society does 
function.  In addition, emphasizing political society allows for the possibility that groups 
or organizations might be within political society at some times (namely, when they 
organize around the principles of influence, self-limitation, accountability and 
representation) and not within political society at another. Labor unions, for instance, 
might be part of political society in one country or context and not in another; so might 
church groups, or football clubs, or PTAs. Political society, therefore, offers a concept 
where groups can come and go as pleasure or need dictates, and which allows us to 
compare across groups and organizations without forcing us to decide ante-facto whether 
or not they are operating within political society. 
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 Fourth and finally, an emphasis on political society better reflects discoveries 
made by the empirical literature. As noted above, this allows us to better grasp the spatial 
realities and interactions of an increasingly globalized world where the lines between 
markets, states and societies are shifting and blurry. More importantly, we can approach 
organizations within political society in more realistic (and empirically defensible) terms. 
The traditional ideals of civil society –as a realm of freedom, a laboratory for democracy, 
a breeding ground for future leaders, a space that encourages civic commitments and 
civic unity, etc. –simply do not accord with the lived experience of many members of 
civil society across the world: civil society organizations (even “successful” ones!) are 
often organized un-democratically, are often less inclusive than typically theorized, and 
can lead to non-democratic results as surely and as quickly as democratic results. Since 
political society is a subset of civil society, it does not preclude that some groups within 
might act in ways that are reflective of these ideals; it simply couches such groups as 
outside the realm of political society, while allowing for the possibility that groups within 
political society might not be democratic, or encourage pluralism, or emphasize civic 
virtue. None of this is to say that groups that fall within civil society but outside political 
society cannot have any role in the democratization process, but it is to say that groups 
within political societies will be major forces for democratization by their very nature. 
This allows us to better understand the difference between groups like Solidarity and 
groups like a Polish student culture association, or between Charter 77 and a Hungarian 
philharmonic orchestra; in other words, the difference between groups which are vital to 
the success of democratization movements and those which function simply in the 
capacity of voluntary association.  
	   
CHAPTER 4 
TOWARD A POLITICAL SOCIETY 
 Political society, as mentioned earlier, is organized around four constituent parts: 
influence, self-limitation, accountability, and representation. To operate within political 
society, a group or organization must be said to utilize all four of these organizational 
strategies: the lack of any one does not mean that such groups are outside of the realm of 
civil society (they might, for instance, be acting as a voluntary social organization, or a 
social movement), but it does mean that such groups are outside of the realm of political 
society. Again, this distinction between political society and civil society writ large 
allows us to approach different groups from multiple perspectives given the different 
needs and desires of such groups; a bird-watching club, for instance, might become part 
of political society if the park where they often meet is threatened by a local housing 
development and they seek to organize themselves around the four strategies listed 
above. Once their claims are heard, however, or once they see their role within political 
society as finished, the members can go back to being simply bird-watchers; still an 
integral part of civil society, to be sure, but no longer within the arena of political society. 
 Groups which can routinely utilize the four strategies are most likely to have a 
positive and vital role in the development of democracy in formerly authoritarian states; 
those groups which cannot are relegated to being outside of the democratization process 
(though they might gain added importance if and when the democracy is strengthened 
and consolidated). Groups of the first kind are vital if the new current of democracy are 
expected to overcome the power of an authoritarian state, or the inertia of political 
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conservatism, or the fears of a new regime, and thus should be the focus of Western aid 
measures aimed at promoting civil society. In the grand game of democratization, some 
players are superstars and some players are benchwarmers, and proponents of democracy 
should be sure to be able to identify which players fill which role. 
Influence 
 For a group or organization to be a part of political society, they must direct their 
claims in accordance with or in opposition to the powers that be, typically the state or the 
ruling regime. As should be clear, an additional component of this requirement is that the 
state or ruling regime hears or recognizes the claims from such groups as, if not 
legitimate, at the very least requiring attention: in other words, groups or organizations in 
political society must be confident that their claims to or against the state will elicit a 
response, manifested either in policy or otherwise. Of course, this requires not only a 
group or organization vocal enough to have their claims reach state or regime elites, but 
also a state that is capable of addressing or repressing such demands. Thus, as has 
become clear in the empirical literature, a strong and capable state is a pre-requisite for 
political society to have a strong and positive impact on democratization. 
 The relationship between a strong state and strong civil society (and, by 
consequence, a strong political society) has attracted much attention in recent years of 
scholars of state and civil society alike. At its most basic level, a strong state tends to be 
one that can control political activity within its sovereign boundaries and, therefore, 
retains a capability for repression. A repressive state might strangle political society from 
getting started, weaken its strength in the consolidation phase, or wipe out major players, 
groups or organizations entirely, but it also seems clear that a strong and repressive state 
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breeds an environment where political society acquires both a receptive audience and the 
possibilities for leadership recruitment. This impact of a strong and repressive state in the 
development of political society could be seen throughout the world particularly in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s: Glenn notes that in Czechoslovakia, “in contrast to 
explanations that emphasize the role of declining state repression in creating 
opportunities for mobilization, it was the continued state repression that provoked the 
emergence of Civic Forum and Public Against Violence” (134; see also Pietrzyk 2003, 
especially page 40). 
 Clearly, then, the state is instrumental as a focus of political society in its actions 
as a repressive force, but this is certainly not the only (or even most important) 
justification for defining political society in terms of its relationship with the state. 
“States remain the highest level of institutional structure at which programs of 
democratization themselves can consistently be advanced. And states remain the most 
crucial objects and vehicles of efforts to achieve ‘self-determination’ or autonomy as a 
political community” (Calhoun, 390). States also provide political societies with a well-
defined and demarcated arena for claims-making, an arena which furthermore “enables 
the citizens to become [politically] active,” as well as one which supports “its citizens to 
facilitate and enable self-acting” (Strachwitz and Zimmer, 279). States also play critical 
roles in legitimating institutions and political spaces where compromise is possible and 
choices can be made, such as in the Round Table discussions in Poland and Hungary (for 
a fuller discussion of these events, see Glenn). Such spaces are crucial to the success of 
political society as it provides groups or organizations with the confidence that their 
claims will be heard: absentee states, by contrast, pose “serious questions of 
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accountability” (Whaites, 346). Furthermore, states political societies an end-point or 
goal of exercising influence, thereby focusing their demands or claims against a unitary, 
definable actor. Finally, a strong state is necessary for effective political society because 
the state (particularly the democratic state) and civil society “are mutually conditional” 
(Strachwitz and Zimmer, 279); thus, political society, “far from acting as a substitute to 
the state, is integrally tied to its fortunes” (Chazan, 304). In the words of John Keane 
(1988) 
Civil society and the state, thus, must become the condition of each other’s 
democratization… without a secure and independent civil society of autonomous 
public spheres, goals such as freedom and equality, participatory planning and 
community decisionmaking will be nothing but empty slogans. But without the 
protective, redistributive and conflict-mediating functions of the state, struggles to 
transform civil society will become ghettoized, divided and stagnant, or will 
spawn their own, new forms of inequality and unfreedom (15). 
 
The state also adopts this central role due to the lack of any viable alternative: simply put, 
the state is the only actor that groups or organizations can appeal to and have a reasonable 
belief in response. Some authors have argued for the potential for the market to act as a 
viable target of political society: as Chazan notes, throughout Africa “voluntary 
organizations have been most active and visible in the economic, not the political, 
sphere… Groups have established elaborate methods to evade the state, lobbied 
governments for better wages and working conditions, and expanded their involvement in 
the informal economy.” This informal economy, Chazan argues, “contributes directly to 
the fortification of civil society by increasing the resources at its disposal and broadening 
its geographical scope” (298).  
 The market, however, offers no guarantee that claims or demands will be heard, 
and in fact discourages spaces for compromise and discussion that the state promotes. As 
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Calhoun argues, “one cannot deny that capitalism offers certain genuine freedoms. At the 
same time, the capitalist ideology itself negates its proffered freedom by reference to the 
immutable ‘laws’ of the market. It claims that the systematic character of markets dictates 
that interference from states or other collective actors… must be kept to a minimum so 
that the capitalist system can organize itself” (392). Additionally, “the spontaneous 
functioning of the market, far from supporting free competition among individuals, leads 
to the continuous concentration of capital. At the level of social structure this does not 
mean actual proletarianization and destitution, but it does account for the continual 
growth of those ‘dependant’ population groups that demand integration” (Srubar, 1996, 
43). Finally, the market seems a poor target for claims because it operates on a logic that 
is often not responsive to ideals or values that most political societies support. “Markets 
celebrate and seek to enhance choice. They are, however, rather less good at providing 
moral guidance as to what people ought to choose” (Gregg 2004, 29). 
 Of course, the final piece of the strategy of influence is that such groups must be 
capable of having their claims heard and recognized. “An effective organization,” 
according to Bratton (1990), “must be able to mobilize not only economic and technical 
‘facts’, but also political ‘clout’” (93). Not only is such clout important for having claims 
heard, it is also vital for the continued recruitment of new members. “Individuals are 
more likely to join organizations which they perceive as possessing a degree of power (or 
a potential for influence, at least). Thus, granting autonomous organizations recognition 
on the macro level is likely to have positive effects on their ability to recruit members on 
the micro level” (Hadenius and Uggla, 1630). Ultimately, then, state involvement is 
crucial for the success of political societies, which offers an insight into the promise of 
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democratization throughout the globe: regardless of the strength of political society, if 
these groups lack a stable and coherent state to hear and respond to their demands, further 
progress towards democracy is unlikely to unfold. 
Self-Limitation 
 The second component of political society is that member groups or organizations 
must be self-limiting: that is, political societies must direct their claims to the state, but 
they must also commit themselves to a rejection of direct power or influence, particularly 
within the state. This of course means that groups which seek to exercise power to the 
detriment of the ruling regime are not properly conceived of as political society, meaning 
that political parties are outside the realm of political society. The requirement for self-
limitation guarantees that political society groups will respond primarily to the demands 
of their members and not of other interests, and furthermore guarantees that such 
organizations will continue to direct their claims to or against the state, as opposed to 
becoming agents of the state. As a result, political societies “may oppose official policies, 
seek to oust governments, and even advocate fundamental regime change; they do not, 
however attempt to assume power themselves” (Chazan, 287). Organizationally speaking, 
then, this means that political society should be comprised “of organizations which, in 
terms of their mission, are of limited scope” (Hadenius and Uggla, 1623). 
 Arato (2000) adds that organizations within political society “must on the whole 
renounce the direct exercise of power, which is appropriate only in revolutionary 
situations” (80, my italics). Thus, even if they have immaculate records and pure 
intentions, political societies risk revolution and regime overthrow, which they do not 
desire: as Bratton (1989) argues, “Civic organizations can never completely replace the 
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state in all its manifold functions; nor should they attempt to” (428). Rather, political 
society organizations have historically been committed to pressuring “the regime to 
reform itself” (Glenn, 51), and have identified “social participation, rather than any 
revisions within the party-state apparatus, as the key” (Ash 2002, 47, italics in original) to 
such reform. Attempts to seek power, rather than granting legitimacy to political 
societies, instead leave their followers questioning their motives and in general rejecting 
future claims of representation. It will therefore be important “for civil actors of all 
types… to eschew all forms of populism and relearn, if need be, the great democratic art 
of political self-limitation” (Arato, 80) as such groups “offer the best prospects for the 
consolidation” and continuation of democracy (Ibid., 65). 
 Perhaps the prime example of political society as self-limiting came from 
Solidarity in Poland in the late 1980s.3 It is often forgotten that Solidarity was not the 
oldest, most established, or even most influential civil society organization in Poland for 
much of the 1980s, but rather gained strength when the Polish ruling regime was forced 
to concede ground and hold Round Tables with leaders of opposition groups. It was in 
these situations where Solidarity was able to influence the agenda and the Polish 
transition process due to their preference for reform rather than revolution. Unlike other, 
more radical groups like Fighting Solidarity, the Young Poland Movement, and the 
Confederation for an Independent Poland, Solidarity opposed those groups who 
threatened “the foundations of the Socialist regime [in Poland]” and “its position in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Another	  excellent	  example	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Civic	  Forum	  in	  Hungary;	  according	  to	  Glenn,	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  negotiation,	  “Civic	  Forum	  was	  led	  to	  strike	  a	  more	  conciliatory	  tone	  and	  explained	  that	  they	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  threaten	  public	  order”	  (176).	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international relations” (Glenn, 55-56). As Glenn suggests, the success of Solidarity in 
Poland was rooted in its nature as a movement that engaged the regime instead of arguing 
for its overthrow and which viewed the Polish state as a legal entity and not as a foreign 
occupation. 
 Political society is therefore a strategy that is inherently self-limiting: while 
groups and organizations may engage the state on any number of issues, and to an 
extensive degree, regime overthrow is not the primary goal of political society. This 
strategy reinforces that of influence, because states are more willing to engage with 
groups within political society as they know that such groups are not seeking and are not 
organized towards regime overthrow. By utilizing a strategy based on self-limitation, 
political societies are separated from political parties, interest groups, and other 
organizations. 
Accountability 
 Groups within political society must also have a strong leadership cadre and an 
ability to funnel claims upwards that such elites must respond to and take responsibility 
for. Furthermore, the people who occupy these leadership positions must be able to 
interact with key elites in the ruling regime and effectively communicate the demands of 
group members to these ruling elites. Constructing political society in such a way, of 
course, seems to impress a somewhat anti-democratic (or at least nondemocratic) stamp, 
which Tocquevillians like Robert Putnam might object to. Such objections, however, lose 
traction when they are help up against the empirical evidence of the generally non-
democratic nature of political societies, both organizationally and ideologically (see, for 
example, Bellanger (2005) and Milton (2005)); as Marcussen (1996) suggests, “local 
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institutions are no more democratic or representative than other organizations, simply 
because they are local or close to the grassroots. Nor are they necessarily less clientelistic 
or rent-seeking than the State” (417). Thus, even political societies that are committed to 
democracy are often organized in ways that are top-heavy, dominated by a single 
individual or group who are often not chosen democratically, and run by directive rather 
than cooperation: such criticisms, in fact, were leveled against Lech Walesa during the 
rise of Solidarity. 
 Moreover, a top-heavy leadership structure does not necessarily lead to an anti-
democratic political society: in fact, if leaders are accountable to group members and are 
felt to be representative of their interests, such organization might actually enhance the 
democratic nature of the group. A derivative of this organizational strategy, federated 
membership, where organizations “possess both local roots and a channel for articulation 
of demands to the policy center,” seem to be “most likely to have an effective policy 
voice” (Bratton 1990, 106). Thus, group members who see their movement represented 
by a central figure or bureau have someone upon who to rest responsibility for the 
movement’s chances, as well as someone to appeal to when they feel the strategy needs 
revision or realignment. Nor is it necessarily the case that groups founded on mass 
leadership have better track records in creating or maintaining democracy, in part because 
the benefits of membership to accrue to all evenly: as Olivo (2011) argues, “while 
learning civic competencies does occur” in many voluntary organizations, “it applies to 
only a small number of members” (740). Indeed, groups that lack this top-heavy 
approach are perhaps most likely to engage in anti-democratic policies or endorse anti-
democratic ideals. 
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 Moreover, understanding political society as rooted in accountability allows us to 
analyze the vitality of groups acting as civil society without focusing on their numerical 
strength, helping us to overcome the proclamation of the death of civil society. Certainly, 
groups within political society – and civil society more generally – experienced drops in 
membership, drops which are in some cases quite dramatic. In Eastern Europe, “the 
period of intensive mobilization was followed by slowdown of civic activity. While 
foundation rates of nonprofit/civil society organizations slightly decreased, membership 
affiliation went down significantly. Political parties were without any doubt the losers of 
the decline of membership affiliation. But, also trade unions and other nonprofits being 
primarily active in the political arena suffered from a decline in membership” 
(Mansfeldova, 117). Nor is it only the case in Eastern Europe: in her case study of 
Leipzig, Olivo (2011) found that “one of the main factors negatively affecting the quality 
of civil society… is the lack of participation and interest in civic involvement among the 
citizenry” (732). This evidence notwithstanding, to define the strength of political society 
simply in terms of the number of members seems to undersell its importance regardless 
of its numerical strength. By acknowledging that groups within political are those which 
are organized around a strong leadership cadre, we can avoid evaluating it strictly in 
terms of membership and start to evaluate it in terms of goals, ideals and influence. 
Representation 
 Finally, groups or organizations that are part of political society must be capable 
of demonstrating their claims as representative to non-members; more specifically, 
groups within political society must convince non-members of the applicability of their 
specific group claims and that their influence upon the state and ruling elites is not 
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limited to the promotion of strictly their group. Representation means, essentially, the 
groups cannot be said to be part of political society unless they can make their claims for 
society as a whole, rather than autoworkers, or schoolteachers, or church officials. 
Solidarity, for instance, attained legitimacy within the larger Polish community “when 
the workers are the various strike sites were willing to forgo wage increases [a group-
specific claim] for the right to unionize and other civil rights [a claim which includes 
non-group members]” (Arato, 35). Groups that are unable to portray themselves as 
representative therefore lack the ability to portray their demands as representative of 
society as a whole, and thereby will have difficulty generating momentum when they 
encounter the state and ruling elites. 
 Typically, groups within political society can attain legitimacy by appealing to 
past events or institutions from which they claim lineage or support. In many cases, the 
institutions are not political, or even social, but rather religious. In Poland, for instance, 
the Catholic Church became a key constructor of citizen identification, one that 
“emphasized its civic, rather than ethnic qualities” (Glenn, 54, see also 57-61), and 
ultimately served “as an institutional space for developing civil society” (Narozhna, 303). 
However, history more generally, and specifically historical nationalist accounts, are also 
prominent in groups’ claims at representation: in addition to the Catholic Church, 
“Solidarity negotiators emphasized the united of ‘society’ or the nation against a foreign 
state” by drawing upon “the romantic tradition of Polish history” (Glenn, 84). Finally, 
public associations more generally are often seen as inspiration for political society, as 
well as appealing “to individuals who [are] already associating and communicating and 
[are] quite different than the atomized” individuals which might be assumed by liberal or 
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totalitarian theory (Arato, 47). This legacy of experience is seen as so crucial to Arato 
that he claims that “all the countries that had successfully negotiated transitions had prior 
experiences with the organizations of parallel publics and associations” (65). 
 Shifting focus from civil society writ large to the subset of political society allows 
scholars of comparative politics and political theory alike to better engage the intricacies 
of the process of democratization and the groups that play key roles in the process. By 
focusing on groups which exhibit influence, self-limitation, accountability and 
representation – that is, those groups which are part of political society – scholars and 
policy-makers can focus on the groups and organizations that are most important to a 
successful transition. The ability to identify which groups can play the biggest role in the 
democratization process can help to better predict what outcomes can be expected, what 
external aid might be required, and how secure democracy will remain. 
	   
 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 The overly simplistic accounting of civil society as the main force in 
democratization has come increasingly under fire. Not only have civil society 
organizations suffered from a loss of membership in countries across the globe, the 
promises of democratic consolidation assured by civil society scholars largely failed to 
materialize in countries in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe. This paper has 
been an attempt to create a more responsive and nuanced theoretical approach to the 
relationship between civil society groups and democracy promotion. By arguing that 
democracy is better guaranteed by groups in political society rather than civil society writ 
large, and by emphasizing the four distinct and mutually interdependent aspects of 
influence, self-limitation, accountability and representation, I have sought to provide a 
blueprint for scholars of democratic transitions and consolidations. 
 Perhaps the greatest take-away from the above discussion is that not all civil 
society groups are created equal. To begin with, there is much empirical evidence from 
works of comparative politics to indicate the civil society is poorly defined and suffering 
from a disconnect between theory and praxis. Conceiving of civil society from a spatial 
perspective no longer reflects the changing relationships between state, market and 
society, and moreover fails to account for groups, like paramilitary organizations, which 
transcend the boundaries between state and society. Moreover, the idealistic definitions 
inherited from Tocqueville of democracy as a laboratory for democracy is not reflected in 
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the role of civil society organizations, NGOs, and other groups that have been theorized 
to be major players in democracy promotion. The current conception of civil society, in 
other words, occludes the fact that certain groups that are said to represent civil society 
do much less in the promotion of democracy than do others. 
 The groups that are most important, then, are those that can engage the powers 
that be, usually the state or ruling regime; those that commit themselves away from the 
direct exercise of state power or influence; those that are organized hierarchically and 
posses a leadership cadre that can interact with key elites; and that can manifest their 
claims as representative of group members and non-members alike. This rubric is not 
only comprehensive, but it is also straight-forward and easily confirmed; the groups 
which fit all of these criteria are the ones that should be emphasized by foreign 
democracy promoters. By directing aid and advice to these groups that make up political 
society, transitions to democracy are likely to be less time-intensive, less violent, and 
more likely to result in long-lasting democracies. In other words, only by emphasizing 
political society can the promises of civil society be realized. 
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